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DEEDS AND THE DETERMINACY NORM:
INSIGHTS FROM BRANDT AND OTHER CASES ON
AN UNDESIGNATED, YET EVER-PRESENT,
INTERPRETIVE METHOD
DONALD J. KOCHAN*
ABSTRACT
The land one holds is generally only as good as the property rights contained in the deed.
The rights contained in the deed are only as good as the ability to get those rights enforced.
And, the enforcement is only valuable if it recognizes a determinate meaning in the deeds from
the point of conveyance. This Article pens the term “determinacy norm” to explain a collection
of rules for the interpretation of deed terms that aim to make the meaning of deed terms determinate. I contend that, in order to satisfy the determinacy norm for deed interpretation,
courts must (and arguably do) interpret the terms in deeds and land grants as having a fixed
meaning set contemporaneously with the transfer and based on the discernable intent and
expectations of the parties at the time of the conveyance or grant. This norm runs through
existing case law and is pivotal to facilitating an effective property system. But, courts have
failed to recognize either the term (or even the organizing principle) that is the determinacy
norm.
As an illustrative example, some see the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court case of Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States as just a railroad right-of-way decision. But a closer look reveals
that it is a good exemplar of courts striving to add determinacy to deeds and equivalent instruments like statutory land grants. Brandt reveals a pattern of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence that the Court itself is not adequately articulating where the determinacy norm
lurks in the substructure of opinions.
We should more directly recognize the determinacy norm’s presence in private deed and
public land grant cases. Doing so will allow us to better monitor and check the actions of
judges to be sure that they are living up to the constraints of the determinacy norm. Such
monitoring will help us better identify and protect the rights in the deeds that help organize
our property system.
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................
II. DEFINING THE DETERMINACY NORM RELATING TO THE INTERPRETATION OF
PROPERTY DEEDS AND EQUIVALENT LAND GRANTS .........................................
III. SELECTED PRE-BRANDT EXAMPLES OF UNSTATED U.S. SUPREME COURT
RECOGNITION OF THE DETERMINACY NORM .....................................................
A. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc. ...................................................................
B. Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe ...............................
C. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States ...........................................................
IV. BRANDT REVOCABLE TRUST V. UNITED STATES: THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF
THE DETERMINACY NORM AT PLAY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT ....................
V. VALUES ADVANCED BY A DETERMINACY NORM OF DEED INTERPRETATION ......
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I. INTRODUCTION
The land one holds is generally only as good as the property rights
contained in the deed. The rights contained in the deed are only as good
as the ability to get those rights enforced. And, the enforcement is only
* Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development and Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School 1998. I wish to thank
Shelley Ross Saxer and Jennifer Spinella for valuable comments on drafts of this work.

794

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:793

valuable if it recognizes a determinate meaning in the deeds from the
point of conveyance. This Article examines those basic tenets of our
system of property law. It posits that the law of property depends on
enforcement of the private agreements expressed in deeds and that the
rules of interpretation for deeds have evolved around what I will call
a “determinacy norm,” without which deeds would have only limited
value, if any at all. In this Article, I define the parameters of the “determinacy norm” as follows: In order to satisfy the determinacy norm
for deed interpretation, courts must interpret the terms in deeds and
land grants as having a fixed meaning set contemporaneously with the
transfer and based on the discernable intent and expectations of the
parties at the time of the conveyance or grant. It is this premise that I
seek to show runs through existing case law and that I intend to defend
as meritorious in our interpretation of deeds and pivotal to facilitating
an effective and efficient property system.
In the 1979 case of Leo Sheep v. United States, the U.S. Supreme
Court articulated an extremely important tenet of judicial interpretation of real property deeds and statutory grants of title when it declared that the “Court has traditionally recognized the special need for
certainty and predictability where land titles are concerned” and that
the Court is extremely conscious of a presumptive “unwilling[ness] to
upset settled expectations” of the parties to the title transfer.1 There is
much to be learned from that statement and the critically important
fundamentals of the determinacy norm that rest behind it.
In several recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, including most recently the March 10, 2014, case of Brandt Revocable Trust v. United
States,2 this tenet has played an undervalued yet critical role in the
determination of the meaning of terms in property deeds (or in the
near-equivalence of deeds, where property is transferred by statutory
grants of land, by government patents, or with statutory reservations
of real property interests). And, this special need for certainty and predictability has been a theme that plays a vital part in the general
preservation of an efficient and effective system of established property rights and secure property conveyances.3

1. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979) (emphasis added).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
3. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 140 (James Alt & Douglass North eds., 1990) (“One gets efficient institutions
by a polity that has built-in incentives to create and enforce efficient property rights.”); Joseph William Singer, Property Law Conflicts, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 129, 130 (2014) (“Predictability and usability of property depend on clear answers to ownership questions.”).
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It is a fundamental principle of the interpretation of property deeds
that they must have a fixed meaning, identifiable at the time of conveyance.4 This concept lacks comprehensive coverage in the literature
and has not been sufficiently captured in a particular term. This Article seeks to fill these gaps and proposes that this concept should be
termed the “determinacy norm” for deed interpretation. This norm focuses on the need to find a definite, exact, and unchanging meaning in
the terms of the deed, set and fixed at the transfer point such that
going forward all parties can rely on a single interpretation in making
investment decisions related to the property and all parties to the deed
transfer can appropriately set their expectations regarding what was
given and what was retained—the “who has what and when” issues. It
is the application of what might be called a “rule of deeds” that reflects
the same rule of law values that we impose on the legal system
generally.5
Property ownership and the scope of one’s deed must be settled,
knowable, and known from the outset of property acquisition. If they
are not, the indeterminacy of the deeds in our system would have profoundly damaging impacts on the investment and incentive structure
present in the private property system. Any other interpretation would
create shifting private property rights whose security would simply be
at the whim of others, including governments, judges, neighbors, or
competing claimants.
This Article will not empirically test whether deed interpretation
is, in fact and in practice, accomplished with a high level of determinacy. That is beyond the scope of this Article, which aims to show in
this installment only that the goal of deed interpretation as expressed
in the rules of interpretation is to find determinate meaning in deeds.
Nonetheless, this Article will show examples where in practice the determinacy norm for deed interpretation seems vibrant.
Thus, this Article analyzes this determinacy norm both in the abstract and, importantly, in the context of several actual cases, including Brandt.6 The Brandt case (like many of the other cases highlighted
here) has received a relatively small amount of attention in scholarly
analysis, and almost none of that attention has focused on the rules of
deed and land grant interpretation,7 even though, as Danaya Wright
4. See 2 ROBERT T. DEVLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DEEDS § 836, at 102, § 851, at
128 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co., 2d ed. 1887); 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 178, Westlaw
(database updated Dec. 2015).
5. See Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 1012 (1995) (“[M]ost theorists have assumed that the rule
of law requires a significant measure of determinacy in legal rules.”).
6. 134 S. Ct. at 1257.
7. Only a few case summaries, articles, or student notes in law journals have been
published since the decision, almost all critical of the outcome and not particularly focused
on deed interpretation issues. See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Doing a Double Take: Rail-Trail
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has written, the Supreme Court in Brandt “hand[ed] the government
a stunning 8-1 defeat on an issue of statutory construction of an 1875
act that granted rights-of-way over public lands to railroads.”8 Part of
the purpose of this Article will be to show that the decision should not
be considered stunning at all if one acknowledges the longstanding
precedents on conveyance interpretation involved in the decision and
their fit inside a pattern of deed-based jurisprudence that recognizes a
determinacy norm.
Brandt can be briefly summarized as follows. The government
claimed reversionary interests in railroad easements after railroad operations ceased.9 The property owners claimed that easement law
counsels differently—that the government only obtained a limited interest in the property, that the purpose of an easement is not transferable to a different use, and if the purpose of the easement ceases then
the owner of the fee absorbs the abandoned easement upon termination of the originally granted use.10 In other words, the government
Takings Litigation in the Post-Brandt Trust Era, 39 VT. L. REV. 703, 705-06 & n.17 (2015)
(focusing largely on takings-related implications of the case) [hereinafter Wright, Doing a
Double Take]; Hannah Christian, Comment, Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United
States: Turning a National Asset into a Private Gain, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 363, 398 (2015)
(lamenting the loss of the new uses to which railroad easements might be put if the federal
government could only retain a reversionary interest and proclaiming the “unjust[]” conversion of “a unique national asset created for the public benefit”); Justin G. Cook, Comment,
How the Supreme Court Jeopardized Thousands of Miles of Abandoned Railroad Tracks with
a Single Opinion [Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014)], 54
WASHBURN L.J. 227 (2014) (arguing that Brandt adversely affects the rails-to-trails system);
Ernest Thompson, Student Article, The Disappearing Railroad Easement Blues: Riding the
Rails of Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 60 S.D. L. REV. 308, 312-15
(2015) (showing basic case summary with a focus on assisting practitioners with related takings clause issues); Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Brandt Revocable Trust: A Victory for Private
Landowners in Abandoned Railroad Right-of-Way Case, PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 2014, at
10 (showing basic case summary with analysis for other railroad easement cases); Norman
A. Dupont, The Supreme Court Decides Rails to Trails Case: A New Governmental Attorney
Estoppel Doctrine or a Case of Revisionist History?, TRENDS, July/Aug. 2014, at 9 (providing
basic case summary); Danaya C. Wright, A New Era of Lavish Land Grants: Taking Public
Property for Private Use and Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, PROB. & PROP.,
Sept./Oct. 2014, at 30 (focusing on takings) [hereinafter Wright, A New Era],
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/probate_property_magazine_2012/2014/september_october_2014/2014_aba_rpte_pp_v28_5_article_wright_lavish_land_grants.html. Professor Wright also wrote an article appearing before the decision. See Danaya C. Wright,
Reliance Interests and Takings Liability for Rail-Trail Conversions: Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United States, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10173 (2014) [Wright, Reliance Interests].
Another law review article provides a useful and relatively impartial analysis. See Shelley
Ross Saxer, “Rails-to-Trails” Potential Impact of Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v.
United States, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 345, 361-67 (2014). One law review article has been
published that supports the decision. See Brian T. Hodges, When the Common Law Runs
into the Constitution: The Train Wreck Avoided in Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v.
United States, 39 VT. L. REV. 673, 675-76 (2015) (discussing impacts on takings and rails-totrails, and defending the decision’s protections for certainty and predictability in land titles).
8. Wright, A New Era, supra note 7, at 30.
9. 134 S. Ct. at 1263.
10. Id.

2016]

DEEDS AND DETERMINACY NORM

797

cannot reserve an easement for one use and decades later convert it
(without re-bargaining or paying more) to a different use that was not
anticipated, expected, or bargained for at the time of the original transfer. The land grant’s provisions must be determinate and not subject
to one party’s choice to expand its rights under it. In some ways, this
seems intuitive. But as the Brandt case and others illustrate, application of what I am calling the determinacy norm has sometimes become
a more complex question in practice (and perhaps unnecessarily so).
The inattention to Brandt in existing literature is undeserved, as
the case teaches us very valuable lessons about the rules for interpretation of deeds that are necessary to an effectively functioning system
of private property.11 In part, the very limited coverage may be because
the case is seen on the surface as one about railroad rights-of-way—a
fairly limited and somewhat obscure area of concern. Yet, in the substructure of the Brandt opinion—while hardly expressly discussed by
the Court—is a necessary recognition of, and respect for, the determinacy norm in the interpretation of deeds. This Article explores and reveals that largely hidden substructure. Thus, while Brandt is interesting and important on its own particulars, what is especially enlightening for this Article’s purposes is the opinion’s implicit endorsement of
the determinacy norm. Especially when read in light of the other recent cases, Brandt reveals a pattern of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in which the Court itself is not adequately articulating where
the determinacy norm is present (even when not expressly stated as
such).
As a brief introductory aside, it should be noted here that this Article will use the term “deeds” broadly, sometimes with the intention of
including within it similar legal instruments that have the same effect
but a different name—principally statutory land grants, government
patents, and statutory reservations. Statutory grants and reservations
and government-issued land patents are, in most respects, subject to
the same rules of interpretation that we apply to deeds between private individuals.12 The only substantial difference between the two is
that ambiguities in deeds are construed against the grantor (at least
when the grantor is the drafter)13 while ambiguities in land grants

11. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 674 (“The Brandt decision . . . is certainly destined for
property law textbooks.”); id. at 695-96 (“The implications of the Supreme Court’s decision
are far-reaching. The common law relies on a predictable and well-understood system for
characterizing the various types of interests in property.”).
12. GEORGE W. THOMPSON, 5B COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 2725, at 383 (1978); Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478, 491 (1865) (“[T]he patent
[land grant authorized by statute] is a deed of the United States.”).
13. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, § 6.1, at 129 (6th ed. 2005) (“A deed is always construed most
strongly against the grantor who has used the language.”).
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from the government are construed in favor of the sovereign.14 Thus,
what this Article concludes for deeds mostly applies to grants, patents,
and reservations, and vice versa.
Part II explains the determinacy norm and the rules of interpretation that collectively follow or flow from that norm. Part III presents a
series of examples from U.S. Supreme Court opinions were the determinacy norm is not expressly iterated but is nonetheless present and
crucial to the Court’s holdings. All of the examples are chosen because
they fall in a line of statutory grant and land patent cases similar to
the recent decision in Brandt. Very curiously, though, the Court itself
has done a very poor job tying these cases together and recognizing
their similarities. In fact, some of these cases were not even cited in
Brandt while others received only passing reference. There appears to
be a lack of comprehension of a thread that binds these cases together,
and this Article seeks to remedy that failing. The principal cases discussed in Part III include Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,15 Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe,16 and BedRoc Ltd., LLC v.
United States.17 Part IV follows with a discussion of Brandt and its lessons for the determinacy norm in deed interpretation.
While hardly an exhaustive list of U.S. Supreme Court cases where
the deed-based determinacy norm lurks in the background, these cases
discussed in Parts III and IV are able educators of the presence of the
norm in our jurisprudence. There are very important lessons in these
cases regarding the vitality of the determinacy norm and the lessons
of Leo Sheep.18 Part V reflects on the benefits of the fierce application
of a determinacy norm in deed interpretation, explaining that the effective functioning, indeed the very existence, of the property system
is dependent on vigorous adherence to the norm and the values it aims
to foster. This Article concludes that we should more directly recognize
the determinacy norm’s presence in deed and land grant cases, so that
we may better synthesize our understanding and application of deedbased jurisprudence and more effectively promote the utility of our
deed-based private property system.

14. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (describing “the established rule that land grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes
except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved for
the Government, not against it”).
15. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
16. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
17. 541 U.S. 176 (2004).
18. 440 U.S. 668, 687 (1979).
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II. DEFINING THE DETERMINACY NORM RELATING
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF PROPERTY DEEDS
AND EQUIVALENT LAND GRANTS
Property deeds must have a fixed meaning, identifiable at the time
of the conveyance, and it is this meaning that a court seeks to find
when interpreting them.19 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in the
1867 case of Cavazos v. Trevino, when construing a grant, a court
should assess the language of the deed and the “the attendant and surrounding circumstances, at the time it was made, . . . for the purpose
of placing the court in the same situation, and giving it the same advantages for construing the paper, which were possessed by the actors
themselves.”20 The Cavazos Court further explained that the “object
and effect” of this exercise is “not to contradict or vary the terms of the
instrument, but to enable the court to arrive at the proper conclusion
as to its meaning and the understanding and intention of the parties.”21 It is a court’s job to put itself in the situation of the parties at
the time of conveyance and to discern the intent of the parties in a
manner that sustains the life, at a later date, of the meaning that was
attached to the deed at that earlier, critical moment in time when the
meaning was birthed. It is this task that makes the deed determinate.
In his noteworthy Treatise on the Law of Deeds, Robert Devlin reported
on the legal standards that have developed over time requiring that
“[a] deed should receive a fair and reasonable construction which will
effectuate the intention of the parties, and a contemporaneous exposition of the deed is always entitled to the greatest consideration.”22 Similar advice regarding the contemporaneous intent-focused nature of
the inquiry into the meaning of deed terms was stated by Lord Chief
Baron Eyre in the 1791 opinion in Gibson v. Minet: “Deeds are at the
common law, they have their operation and their construction by the
rules of the common law, they are contracts of a more solemn nature

19. DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 836, at 102, § 851, at 128; see also 23 AM. JUR. 2D
Deeds § 248, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2015) (“In the construction of the language
used in a deed for the purpose of ascertaining the land conveyed, the intention of the parties,
especially that of the grantor, as deduced from the whole instrument and the surrounding
circumstances and conditions is controlling, just as it is in determining any other question
arising in the construction of the deed.”); 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 178, supra note 4 (“Interpretation of a deed focuses upon the intention of the parties at the time of the conveyance . . . .”);
RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.05[3][a] (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
2015) (“The intent of the parties is the polestar for interpreting a deed . . . .”); Hodges, supra
note 7, at 696 (“The terms used by the common law have precise definitions and a complex
system of rules flows from those definitions.”).
20. 73 U.S. 773, 784 (1867) (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 851, at 128.
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than other contracts; between particular parties, respecting particular
interests, in particular subjects.”23 It is this particularity that makes
the determinate deeds valuable.
This Part probes what we mean by a “determinacy norm” for deed
interpretation and catalogs some of the rules of interpretation that further the norm, like those described above. “Determinacy” is defined in
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as “the quality or state of being determinate” and “the state of being definitely and unequivocally characterized: exactness.”24 Individuals engaging in transactions associated
with property, particularly those who place a reliance on deeds (including, but not limited to, buyers), demand this “exactness” and ability to
predict the scope of the ownership interests of any one property
“owner.” “Determinate” is similarly defined as “definitely known or decided” and “definitely settled.”25 In this sense, the determinacy norm in
property law reflects many of the same values as the rule of law generally, including non-retroactivity and the inability to change the rules
of the game as time goes on.26 The focus on interpreting the meaning
of deeds “at the time of conveyance”27 is key because it sets a temporal
point where exactness is decided and when matters of the deed are
“definitely settled,” after which they are not to be disturbed lest we
enter the realm of indeterminacy.
Although not much discussion regarding the determinacy of deeds
exists in the literature, there is a rich discussion regarding indeterminacy of law generally—questioning whether law can be objective and
provide single answers to questions—from which some insights can be
23. Gibson v. Minet (1791) 126 Eng. Rep. 326 (HL) 351 (appeal taken from Eng.) (emphasis added). The rules for property law and the regard for property rights have deep roots
in the origins of the common law. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139
(“The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which consists
in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. The origin of private property is probably founded
in nature . . . .”); ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 107 (1966) (“[C]ommon
law of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is in large part the law of land and tenures, the
law of property rights . . . . A glance at the chapters of Magna Carta or at any collection of
common-law writs will reveal the dominant concern with rights in land . . . .”).
24. Determinacy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
determinacy (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
25. Determinate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
determinate (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
26. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 656 (1829) (Story, J.) (discussing
the “danger, inconvenience and mischiefs of retrospective legislation in general,” including
its effects in “disturb[ing] the security of titles”).
27. 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 202, Westlaw (database updated Nov.
2015) (“Deeds generally are subject to the same rules of construction as are applied to contracts. The primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the parties as expressed in the
deed . . . . The rights of the parties are determined by the law as it exists at the time of the
conveyance.”) (emphasis added); see also DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 836, at 102-03 (“As in the
case of all contracts, the intent of the parties to the deed, when it can be obtained from the
instrument, will prevail, unless counteracted by some rule of law.”).
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borrowed to explain my use of the term “determinacy” regarding deeds.
For example, Kent Greenawalt compares the definition of determinacy
to what we mean by the rule of law, positing that determinacy in law
means one finds the answer in the law:
Here the “rule of law” idea connects to my basic standard for a determinate answer. The main criterion for judging the existence of a
determinate answer is whether virtually any intelligent person familiar with the legal system would conclude, after careful study,
that the law provides that answer. This standard reflects well the
notion that the answer exists independently of either individual idiosyncrasies or controversial moral and political judgments.28

One can analogize Greenawalt’s definition to the meaning of determinacy in deed interpretation by saying that the answer to the deed’s
meaning lies in the deed, which is infused with the ingredients of the
terms used by the parties and their corresponding intent at the time
that the deed—like the law—was written and executed such that it
provided the answer then and always. With this focus on temporal and
constant meaning, the lessons of Douglass North are applicable here
as well when he concludes that “[s]ecure property rights will require
political and judicial organizations that effectively and impartially enforce contracts across space and time.”29 The meaning of the terms in
a deed begins and remains with the deed—forever set “across space
and time” from the point of conveyance—and is not later found in some
other point of authority, opinion, or competing value.
Consider also another definition of the indeterminacy of law generally. Again, the context for the following statements is the debate over
whether law itself suffers from indeterminacy (i.e., it lacks the characteristics of objectivity, neutrality, etc.), but there are lessons that can
be drawn for the definition of deed determinacy. Ken Kress articulates
that “[l]aw is indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack single right answers. In adjudication, law is indeterminate to the extent
that authoritative legal materials and methods permit multiple outcomes to lawsuits.”30 Accepting this reasoning, deeds are indeterminate if we do not ground their interpretation in a set of rules that work
to induce judges to find a single right answer based in a definite source
of authority. With deeds, that source of authority is the deed itself and
the intent of the parties as judged by the deed terms and other evidence of intent that existed contemporaneously with the execution of

28. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1990).
29. NORTH, supra note 3, at 121.
30. Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989).
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the deed.31 So, whereas Kress says of the metrics for evaluating the
determinacy of law in general that “[l]aw is indeterminate where the
correct theory of legal reasoning fails to yield a right answer or permits
multiple answers to legal questions,”32 the deed interpretation rules
discussed here and below are at the very least attempting to create a
theory of legal reasoning that prohibits multiple answers to the meaning of a deed.
Finally, let us consider Lawrence Solum’s definitions of indeterminacy in the debate over the general nature of law and legal systems.
Solum provides definitions for three key terms. First, he argues that
“[t]he law is determinate with respect to a given case if and only if the
set of results that can be squared with the legal materials contains one
and only one result.”33 In contrast, Solum posits that “[t]he law is indeterminate with respect to a given case if and only if the set of results
in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is identical
with the set of all imaginable results.”34 The point here is that indeterminacy will exist if one is not constrained in the choice of result. Where
there are no rules for deed interpretation to constrain a judge’s pool of
available interpretations down to one, the deeds that would be interpreted would suffer from indeterminacy. Thus, if we wish to foster determinacy in deeds, the rules of interpretation for deeds should be, and
are, designed to limit the possible meanings given to a deed term to
one and only one meaning. Of course, the law may strive for absolute
determinacy and fall short yet not entirely devolve into indeterminacy.
Thus, Solum proposes that “[t]he law is underdeterminate with respect
to a given case if and only if the set of results in the case that can be
squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of
all imaginable results.”35 Using this definition of “underdeterminate”
and recognizing that rules limiting choice of interpretation are imperfect and may not always be followed, it may be that, in practice, the
legal system generally and deed interpretation in particular is better
characterized as falling in this underdeterminate category. I will leave
exploration of that debate for another day. Instead, my focus in this
Article is to defend the proposition that the deed interpretation rules
are at least structured with the goal of determinacy in mind and that
they seek to operate as a constraint designed to limit judges to a single
(closed set of one) interpretation of any particular deed.
31. DEVLIN, supra note 4, § 836, at 103-04 (“The rule is that the intention of the parties
is to be ascertained by considering all the provisions of the deed, as well as the situation of
the parties, and then to give effect to such intention if practicable when not contrary to law.”).
32. Kress, supra note 30, at 320.
33. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
34. Id. (emphasis omitted).
35. Id. (emphasis omitted).

2016]

DEEDS AND DETERMINACY NORM

803

The meaning of determinacy of deed interpretation is also informed
by understanding the relationship between determinacy and the rule
of law. There are substantial similarities between the importance
served by a determinacy norm for deed interpretation and the goals
sought by embracing rule of law values, including determinacy.
The rule of law includes the freedom from what John Locke calls
the “inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will” of others.36 As Joseph Story has explained, it is particularly important that rule of law
values dominate when it comes to private property concerns:
Indeed, in a free government, almost all other rights would become
utterly worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable
power over the private fortune of every citizen. One of the fundamental objects of every good government must be the due administration of justice; and how vain it would be to speak of such an
administration, when all property is subject to the will or caprice of
the legislature, and the rulers.37

Thomas Morgan and Robert Tuttle explain the utility and necessity of
being able to discern the law’s meaning and boundaries, stating that
“[i]n order to act freely within their protected realm and to participate
effectively in cooperative acts, individuals must know ‘with fair certainty’ what the law is.”38 They continue that “[i]f the law is radically
indeterminate, official discretion will not be bounded, individual freedom will not be secure, and social interaction will become infinitely
more complex.”39 These conclusions regarding the dangers when the
rule of law is absent are equally applicable to what would happen if we
fail to respect a determinacy norm for deeds. Freedom to exchange or
invest in property is insecure when we do not know whether our deed
rights will be enforced.40 Social interaction, including conveying and
36. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (C. B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690). Consider Locke’s description of the protection against arbitrary or
indeterminate rules:
[F]reedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it;
a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and
not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another
man . . . .
This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely
joined with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits
his preservation and life together . . . .
Id. (emphasis omitted).
37. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1784, at 661 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
38. Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 5, at 1012.
39. Id.
40. See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
335 (J. Kahane trans., Liberty Fund 1981) (1936) (“The desire for an increase of wealth can
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contracting property rights, is more complex when the reliance and
confidence regarding the enforceability of deed rights necessary to incentivize productive behavior and investment are diminished.
Drawing from these definitions, it seems clear that to achieve determinacy in the interpretation of deeds, courts must adopt rules that
ensure that the ownership and the scope of one’s deed rights are settled, knowable, and known from the point of the deed’s execution. Perhaps most importantly, we must judge the meaning of deed terms in
private conveyances, and in statutory land grants, at the time of the
conveyance or grant, in accordance with the intent of the private parties to an agreement, or the intent and expectations of the government
and its patentees, when dealing with language in a statutory land
grant or patent.41 Without these standards to foster determinacy, property owners would be left with little security in the rights held through
their deeds, and the system of property law would lack the legitimacy
it requires.42
Both the rule of law and determinacy norms seek to add a sense of
established and knowable standards upon which individuals can predict enforceability of rules and adjust their behaviors43 and where government officials, including judges, are constrained from upsetting expectations and the justifiable reliance individuals place on pre-set
rules.44 Friedrich Hayek, for example, explains that the rule of law
“means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and
announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with
fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given
circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge.”45
be satisfied through exchange, which is the only method possible in a capitalist economy, or
by violence and petition as in a militarist society, where the strong acquire by force, the weak
by petitioning.”).
41. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 191, supra note 4 (“Courts may determine the intent of the parties in a disputed deed with reference to the position of the parties at the time of conveyance
and in light of surrounding circumstances, and resort to rules of construction.”); cf.
Greenawalt, supra note 28, at 38 (“The claim that the law can yield determinate answers is
most straightforward with respect to simple statutory texts.”).
42. Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 5, at 1011-12 (“The legitimacy of the rule of law in
a pluralistic society is usually taken to depend on two of its features, neutrality and
determinacy.”).
43. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008)
(“[M]any conceptions of the Rule of Law place great emphasis on legal certainty, predictability, and settlement; on the determinacy of the norms that are upheld in society; and on the
reliable character of their administration by the state.”).
44. See id. (“The Rule of Law is a multi-faceted ideal. Most conceptions of this ideal,
however, give central place to a requirement that people in positions of authority should
exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms, rather than on the
basis of their own preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and
wrong.”).
45. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944).
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The basis of legitimacy for a government begins with the rule of
law,46 which can be defined as having the following characteristics
within the legal system: (1) clear, known, and understandable laws,
rules, and regulations; (2) predictability and certainty of enforcement,
application, and the protection of rights and remedies for wrongs; (3)
procedural validity and regularity in the establishment of laws, rules,
and regulations; (4) fair and equal, non-biased application of the laws,
rules, and regulations; and (5) freedom from arbitrary, capricious, or
ad hoc decisions that make the law so indeterminate and unestablished as to make predictable compliance impossible.47
Consider the recent counsel of the Michigan Supreme Court on the
virtues of predictable and stable interpretations of property rights.48 It
began by quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation in Payne v.
Tennessee regarding the general benefits of stare decisis effects in law
that, “[i]n approaching any case, ‘[s]tare decisis is the preferred course
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’ ”49 The court then continued that “if there is any realm within
which the values served by stare decisis—stability, predictability, and
continuity—must be most certainly maintained, it must be within the
realm of property law,” especially because of the extensive reliance
parties place on the “establish[ed] ‘rules of property.’ ”50 As the Michigan Supreme Court had accurately explained in a previous case,

46. See Waldron, supra note 43, at 3 (“The Rule of Law is one of the most important
political ideals of our time. It is one of a cluster of ideals constitutive of modern political
morality, the others being human rights, democracy, and perhaps also the principles of free
market economy.”) (footnote omitted).
47. RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 1-22 (2001); see LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (noting the ways in which a system of legal rules
may fail, resulting in not only a flawed legal system, but a nonexistent legal system); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235, 237 (4th prtg. 1972) (“A legal system is a coercive order
of public rules . . . . When these rules are just they establish a basis for legitimate expectations. . . . [A]ctions which the rules of law require and forbid should be of a kind which [individuals] can reasonably be expected to do and to avoid.”). Waldron summarizes Fuller’s ideas
as follows:
A conception of the Rule of Law like the one just outlined emphasizes the
virtues that Lon Fuller discussed in The Morality of Law: the prominence of general norms as a basis of governance; the clarity, publicity, stability, consistency,
and prospectivity of those norms; and congruence between the law on the books
and the way in which public order is actually administered.
Waldron, supra note 43, at 7.
48. 2000 Baum Family Tr. v. Babel, 793 N.W.2d 633, 655 (Mich. 2010).
49. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (citing Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991)).
50. Id. (citing Bott v. Comm’n of Nat. Res., 327 N.W.2d 838, 849 (Mich. 1982)).
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“[j]udicial ‘rules of property’ create value, and the passage of time induces a belief in their stability that generates commitments of human
energy and capital.”51 Predictable interpretation of determinate deeds
operates much like stare decisis in producing these benefits of stability
in the property system.
If an owner is in a dispute with someone contesting the terms of a
deed, there is no security or confidence in the owner’s ability to prove
the legitimacy of her rights under the deed unless there is a neutral
state enforcement system that is searching for a determinate answer
to the meaning of the deed’s terms.
The security one feels in her deed rights is directly proportional to
the level of confidence she has in this process. Her property will diminish in value if she lacks the ability to confidently and accurately predict
how the neutral enforcement system will adjudicate disputes over the
deed.52 So, too, will a buyer or investor’s incentives change based on
what degree of accuracy exists for assessing the judicial interpretation
risks associated with investments in or acquisition of property. Thus,
our legal system provides the opportunity to prove ownership and operates to adjudicate the rights articulated in the terms of deeds on the
basis of set and known rules.
By further examining a few well-established rules for the interpretation of deeds we can see that the formulation of these rules can be
justified as furthering the determinacy norm for deed interpretation.
Deeds are law by private ordering, and as such they need rule of law
values to govern their interpretation if such ordering is to be effective.
Critical amongst those rule of law values at play with deed interpretation is knowability. Knowable deed rights are necessary to predict and
structure investment. As Hayek has explained in relation to the determinacy aspects of the rule of law generally:
The rationale of securing to each individual a known range within
which he can decide on his actions is to enable him to make the fullest use of his knowledge . . . . The law tells him what facts he may
count on and thereby extends the range within which he can predict
the consequences of his actions.53

51. Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 849.
52. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 697 (discussing Brandt and positing that “[i]f courts
are unwilling to give effect to titles, then the owners’ interests and expectations in their
property become potentially worthless”).
53. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-57 (1960).
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Individuals tailor their behavior to their expectations created by the
division of rights they perceive manifest in the executed deeds. The
less stable the expectations, the less likely one will invest in the acquisition or improvement of property.54
Courts routinely focus on the well-established rule that the intent
of the parties governs the interpretation of deeds. The purpose of deed
interpretation is to identify “the object had in view by the parties.”55 As
the rules that have developed for deed interpretation clearly state, the
task for the interpreting judge is to ascertain intent, focusing in on the
law, language, situation, and circumstances “when the instrument
was framed.”56 The aim is to give a deed a fixed meaning from a fixed
time forward, with enforceability tied to that moment and adjudication
aimed at finding the meaning of the deed’s terms as of that historical
moment. And, through private ordering, private law accomplishes the
adjustment of property rights through deeds; thus the intent and desires of the private parties affected—or, the “law” that they have chosen to regulate the allocation of property rights between them—should
dictate the interpretation of their agreements.57
The fact that courts try to resolve the meaning and identify the intent as expressed in and based on the text alone whenever possible58
54. See Waldron, supra note 43, at 6-7. Waldron explains one account of the rule of law
as stressing the ties between the ability to predict legal outcomes, expectations, and willingness to invest as follows:
On this account, the Rule of Law is violated when . . . officials act on the basis
of their own discretion rather than norms laid down in advance. If actions of this
sort become endemic, then not only are people’s expectations disappointed, but
they will increasingly find themselves unable to form any expectations at all,
and the horizons of their planning and their economic activity will diminish
accordingly.
Id.
55. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 429, supra note 4 (explaining the rules for construing restrictions
on the use of property and that “effect is to be given to the intention of the parties, as shown
by the language of the instrument, considered in connection with the circumstances surrounding the transaction, and the object had in view by the parties”) (footnote omitted).
56. See Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300, 310 (1888). In Colton, the U.S. Supreme Court
explained:
The object . . . of a judicial interpretation of [every written instrument] is to ascertain the intention of the testator [or grantor], according to the meaning of the
words he has used, deduced from a consideration of the whole instrument and a
comparison of its various parts in the light of the situation and circumstances
which surrounded the testator [or grantor] when the instrument was framed.
Id. (emphasis added); see also 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 181, supra note 4 (“[T]he construction of a
deed must be governed by the strict rules of the common law, and the governing law at the
time of conveyance.”) (footnote omitted).
57. See 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 178, supra note 4 (“The main object in construing a deed is
to ascertain the intention of the parties.”).
58. See Van Ness v. Mayor of Wash., 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 232, 285 (1830) (“Here we have a
solemn instrument embodying the final intentions and agreements of the parties, without
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is another important determinacy norm-based rule. First, judicial
rules that focus on the text of the document for ascertaining intent
incentivize parties to memorialize their intent in precise, revealing,
and informative text. The judicial interpretation rules route behavior.
Thus, it incentivizes complete and clearer drafting when the parties
know that judges and others will look first to the language in the transfer documents when interpreting deeds. Second, the focus on the text
reflects our desire as a society to have set rules and an identifiable
place where persons outside the transaction transferring the property
(and not just judges) can ascertain the respective rights of the parties.59
Intent matters because it is what the parties themselves are most
intimately associated with and most capable of discovering between
themselves in order to evaluate their respective rights and tailor their
behaviors to the property and the rights, immunities, liabilities and
obligations associated with the land transaction.60 When interpreting
the terms of a conveyance that have “natural meaning” and when the
parties use “appropriate terms of art” understood within property law
to express their meaning and intent, then that determinate meaning
controls, and the court cannot “defeat the legal meaning, and resort to
a conjectural intent.”61 The courts cannot ignore the will of the private
parties as expressed in the terms of the deed by construing them any
other way.62 To do so would, in the words of Lord Eyre, which were
later incorporated in an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, mean that
“we no longer construe men’s deeds, but make deeds for them,”63 which
is a line the courts cannot cross.

any allegation of mistake; and we are to construe that instrument according to the legal
import of its terms.”); see also 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 195, supra note 4 (“The primary rule in
construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the parties from the deed itself, construed
as a whole.”) (footnote omitted); 74 C.J.S. Railroads § 163, Westlaw (database updated Dec.
2015) (“A court will give effect to the intention of the parties to instruments conveying a
right-of-way or other interests to a railroad as far as can be ascertained from the
instrument.”).
59. See Gisborn v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 142 U.S. 326, 331-36 (1892) (showing
terms of written instruments arrived at by having the parties determine their rights).
60. See HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra note 13, § 6.1, at 128 (“The purpose of construing
a conveyance or will when its terms are ambiguous is to determine the intention of the parties. All rules of construction are subservient to this purpose. In other words, the first rule
of construction is to give effect to the parties’ intent.”).
61. Van Ness, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 285 (“How then can the court defeat the legal meaning,
and resort to a conjectural intent?”).
62. See id. at 286 (“But it is sufficient for us, that here there is a solemn conveyance,
which purports to grant an unlimited fee . . . and we know of no authority which would justify
us in disregarding the terms, or limiting their import, where no mistake is set up and none
is established.”).
63. United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 91 U.S. 72, 86 (1875) (quoting Lord Chief Baron
Eyre in Gibson v. Minet, (1791) 126 Eng. Rep. 326 (HL) 351 (appeal taken from Eng.)) (adding
that “[t]his rule is as applicable to a statute as to a deed”).
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Thus, based on these stated rules of interpretation and the survey
of the way courts themselves have historically treated the search for
meaning in deed terms, I repeat from the introduction the formulation
of the summary for what can be called the determinacy norm for the
interpretation of deeds: In order to satisfy the determinacy norm, courts
must interpret the terms in deeds and land grants as having a fixed
meaning set contemporaneously with the transfer and based on the discernable intent and expectations of the parties at the time of the conveyance or grant. With that formulation in view, an analysis of the cases
in the next two Parts begins to reveal the yet-obscured threads that
bind them together. Each holding can be justified based on interpretive
rules that reflect the determinacy norm.
III. SELECTED PRE-BRANDT EXAMPLES OF UNSTATED
U.S. SUPREME COURT RECOGNITION
OF THE DETERMINACY NORM
This Part identifies several examples from U.S. Supreme Court
opinions in which the interpretive foundations of the determinacy
norm are applied. The Court appears to be following a trend that it has
not yet articulated (at least not with any sense of clarity). Each of the
examples in this Part have similarities with Brandt, although the
Brandt opinion hardly cited them.
Because property is traditionally a state law issue, the U.S.
Supreme Court hears few cases involving the interpretation of deeds.
When it has engaged in such interpretation of deeds, it has normally
followed the determinacy norm-based interpretive rules, as some of the
example cases in Part II illustrate. More often, the Court is called upon
to interpret federal statutory land grants (and reservations) and land
patents.
After all this talk about “deeds” so far in this Article, some readers
may wonder why this Part is so heavily focused on the interpretation
of statutory land grants and land patents. The answer is basic. As you
may recall from the introduction, courts adopt the same core construction rules for interpreting statutory land grants and patents (the terms
we associate with public, or government, conveyances) as they do for
interpreting deeds (the term we per se associate with private conveyances).64 Most often, this Article is using “deeds” loosely as shorthand
to refer to all of these similar legal instruments. The determinacy norm
is prevalent in each category in the same way without regard to the
proper name we give to these documents that secure and establish
ownership rights depending on the status of the grantor. As noted earlier, there is a bit of a difference in the presumptions that apply in the
64. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
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face of ambiguity in these instruments: ambiguities in private deeds
most often are construed against the grantor when the grantor is the
drafter, but ambiguities in public land grants are construed in favor of
the sovereign.65 Neither that distinction nor any other nuances in construction are really consequential for the analysis in this Article.
What is important for our purposes is that these cases in this Part
all show the determinacy norm employed to reach the conclusions in
the cases, although none of the opinions say directly that the judges
are doing so. But we can learn from these cases how the determinacy
norm operates. And whether we look at “deed” cases or “land grant”
cases to witness the norm’s application is largely inconsequential. Private conveyance law can learn from public conveyance law, and the
same is true in reverse.
I have chosen these cases in part because they exemplify the operation of the determinacy norm (and demonstrate that the courts, unfortunately, do not so label it). I have also chosen them because of
Brandt’s currency. And lastly, I have chosen to focus on these cases
because their interconnectedness is neither fully recognized by the
Court nor by the literature, and that deficit is really something worth
correcting.
Thus, one ancillary purpose of this Part, separate from the goal of
elucidating the determinacy norm, is to, for the first time, present
these cases together so that one can see how closely related they are
as a matter of land grant interpretation and natural resources law.
That alone makes the collection of cases interesting. The cases presented below also provide excellent case studies in the application of
the determinacy norm while failing to expressly say so. Finally, please
note that this is an illustrative, rather than an exhaustive, collection
of Supreme Court analysis on these issues. Through this collection,
however, it should be clear that the determinacy norm is vibrant in
deed and land grant jurisprudence.
A. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.
In Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,66 the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983
was required to interpret a mineral reservation in land patented under
the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (“SRHA”),67 which “provided
for the settlement of homesteads on lands the surface of which was
65. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (describing “the established rule that land
grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts they are resolved for the Government,
not against it” (citing Caldwell v. United States, 250 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1919))); see also supra
notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
66. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
67. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1970) (repealed 1976).
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‘chiefly valuable for grazing and raising crops’ and ‘not susceptible of
irrigation from any known source of water supply.’ ”68 As mentioned
earlier, a land “patent” is essentially the term used in the place of
“deed” when the “conveying” of real property is done by the federal
government granting the property to a private individual.69 When
granting property through land patents issued pursuant to the SRHA,
the statute provided that “all the coal and other minerals” were reserved and owned by the United States.70 In the Western Nuclear case,
the question became whether gravel was one of the “other minerals”
reserved and belonging to the United States or, alternatively, whether
that gravel belonged to the patentee who received all property rights
except those reserved.71
Importantly, the Court attempted to find a definitive meaning from
dictionaries or “legal understanding of the term ‘minerals’ that prevailed in 1916.”72 This effort illustrates the Court’s recognition of the
obligation to seek to find a determinate meaning when possible that is
tied to the time of the deed’s execution or the statutory grant’s passage
into law. Ultimately, the Court found those sources wanting,73 but it
did interpret the meaning and scope of “other minerals” by relying on
“the purposes of the SRHA”74 which existed in the statute and thus
were present and discoverable by the parties at the time of the transfer’s authorization and forever set for the future. In other words, the
source of the patent’s interpretation (the SRHA) had a fixed meaning
at the fixed time of the SRHA enactment and within the fixed and
knowable purposes of the SRHA. The Court’s focus was on what “Congress plainly contemplated”75 in the terms and what “Congress plainly
expected”76 as well as what “Congress certainly could not have expected”77 regarding the usages of the lands patented at the time it created the SRHA land grant scheme.
Although the Court never expressly stated it, it seemed to hint at
least that the SRHA patentees themselves also could not have expected that they would get rights to the gravel because the purposes
68. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 37 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 292).
69. See Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2014) (“A land
patent is an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made public, or
‘patent.’ ”).
70. W. Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 37 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 299).
71. See id. at 37-38.
72. Id. at 46-47.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 47.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 53.
77. Id. at 55; see also id. at 47 (making a conclusion “[s]ince Congress could not have
expected”).
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of their grants did not include mining. The Court engaged in a lengthy
evaluation of Congress’s knowledge of mineral law as of 1916 (the time
of enactment of the SRHA) and its intent and expectations for the
SRHA78 before concluding that “[w]hatever the precise scope of the
mineral reservation may be, we are convinced that it includes
gravel.”79 Whether one agrees with the majority’s assessment of what
Congress intended or what it meant, there is no doubt that the majority believed that it was required to identify Congress’s intent and expectations at the time of the SRHA enactment in order to determine
the respective rights of the parties. For example, it concluded that
“Congress could not have expected that stockraising and raising crops
would entail the extraction of gravel deposits from the land,”80 and
thus “the congressional purpose of facilitating the concurrent development of both surface and subsurface resources is best served by construing the mineral reservation to encompass gravel.”81 The Court supported its interpretation by employing “the established rule that land
grants are construed favorably to the Government, that nothing passes
except what is conveyed in clear language, and that if there are doubts
they are resolved for the Government, not against it”82 and by relying
on legislative history.83 All in all, Western Nuclear is an example of a
case where, although the Court could not find completely unambiguous intent, it nonetheless worked extremely hard to try to get to that
point with an understanding of the importance of setting a meaning
that existed and became effective upon enactment of the SRHA and
that would also have been understood by Congress and the patentee
at that time too. That exercise was in the spirit of following the determinacy norm.
B. Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe
In Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe,84 the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1999 interpreted the scope of land patents issued
pursuant to the Coal Land Acts of 1909 and 1910 (collectively “Coal
Land Acts”) and in so doing had occasion to employ interpretative rules
that underlay what I am here calling the determinacy norm. The
patents under the Coal Land Acts “conveyed to the patentee the land
and everything in it, except the ‘coal,’ which was reserved to the United

78. Id. at 48-56.
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 59 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S. 112,
116 (1957)).
83. Id. at 60.
84. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
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States.”85 Inside coal seams, there is often present another mineral
known as coal bed methane (“CBM”).86 So, the Court was required,
when interpreting the reservation, to determine whether the term
“coal” (covering the reserved property in the patent belonging to the
United States) included CBM.87 It held that CBM was not part of the
“coal”—CBM was distinct and thus was included within the patentee’s
package of ownership.88 In doing so, the Court was again focused on
finding a determinate meaning at the time of the Coal Lands Acts such
that the parties could, with confidence, identify the state of ownership
at the time the Acts passed (and consequently all of this would already
be known when the patents issued as well).
The Court very clearly explained that the interpretation of a land
grant (or conveyance) cannot be dependent on present-day knowledge
or current understanding. We must look back at the time of the conveyance or grant and try to determine what the parties would have
expected the boundaries of the transfer to be:
While the modern science of coal provides a useful backdrop for our
discussion and is consistent with our ultimate disposition, it does
not answer the question presented to us. The question is not
whether, given what scientists know today, it makes sense to regard
CBM gas as a constituent of coal but whether Congress so regarded
it in 1909 and 1910. In interpreting statutory mineral reservations
like the one at issue here, we have emphasized that Congress “was
dealing with a practical subject in a practical way” and that it intended the terms of the reservation to be understood in “their ordinary and popular sense.” We are persuaded that the common conception of coal at the time Congress passed the 1909 and 1910 Acts
was the solid rock substance that was the country’s primary energy
resource.89

The Court exhaustively examined both the language and surrounding circumstances that would have informed Congress at the time of
enactment of the Coal Land Acts, noting, among other things, that “[a]t
the time the Acts were passed, most dictionaries defined coal as the
solid fuel resource,”90 and thus:
[T]he common understanding of coal in 1909 and 1910 would not
have encompassed CBM gas, both because it is a gas rather than a

85. Id. at 867.
86. Id. at 872-73.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 880.
89. Id. at 873-74 (emphasis added) (first quoting Burke v. S. Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669,
679 (1914); then citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
90. Amoco Prod. Co., 526 U.S. at 874 (emphasis added).
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solid mineral and because it was understood as a distinct substance
that escaped from coal as the coal was mined, rather than as a part
of the coal itself.91

Therefore, when the United States reserved “coal” for itself, neither
Congress nor the patentees would have expected that CBM was reserved. The Court buttressed this interpretation and its “at the time”analysis by looking at the surrounding circumstances including the
practicalities of the subject92 and the fact that, given the “condition of
the country when the acts were passed,”93 CBM was not even considered in the same category as coal (a valuable resource) but instead was
largely considered an uneconomic and “dangerous waste product.”94 All
of the focus was on identifying a determinate meaning as of the date
of enactment of the statutes authorizing the patents. Finally, it is important to note that the Court was confident in its plain meaning interpretation and stated that “[b]ecause we conclude that the most natural interpretation of ‘coal’ as used in the 1909 and 1910 Acts does not
encompass CBM gas, we need not consider the applicability of the
canon that ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the
sovereign.”95
C. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States
In BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States,96 the U.S. Supreme Court in
2004 was required to interpret the meaning of terms in another statutory reservation tied to a statutorily authorized grant of government
property to a private individual. The Pittman Underground Water Act
of 1919 (“Pittman Act”) authorized the transfer of a land patent97 to
91. Id. at 874-75 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 873 (first citing Burke, 234 U.S. at 679; then citing Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42).
93. Id. at 875 (emphasis added) (quoting Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,
682 (1979)).
94. Id. at 876.
95. Id. at 880. This rule finds itself in many court opinions, including this one drawing
on the lessons of Vattel:
Vattel’s first general maxim of interpretation is that “it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation,” and he continues: “When a deed is
worded in clear and precise terms—when its meaning is evident and leads to no
absurd conclusion—there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning
which such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjectures, in
order to restrict or extend it, is but to elude it.” Here the words are plain and
interpret themselves.
Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526, 534 (1883) (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
244 (John Chitty ed., The Lawbook Exch. Ltd. 2006) (1854).
96. 541 U.S. 176 (2004).
97. Id. at 179; see also Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1262
(2014) (“A land patent is an official document reflecting a grant by a sovereign that is made
public, or ‘patent.’ ”).
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settlers for the purposes of supporting and incentivizing irrigation projects in the area of the land patents within the State of Nevada.98
These grants by statute—the equivalent of legislative “conveyances”—had language (as did the express terms of the patent document itself) that included a “reservation to the United States of all the
coal and other valuable minerals in the lands . . . together with the
right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same.”99 The predecessors
in title to the property owners in the BedRoc case held their Pittman
Act property subject to this reservation, yet they proceeded to extract
sand and gravel from that property.100 The United States brought administrative actions against the land grant holders, including claiming
a trespass on the property of the United States.101 The property in question was namely the sand and gravel that the government claimed belonged to the United States because the sand and gravel were supposedly “valuable minerals” and thus would have been severed from the
original patent and included in the reservation.102 The owners of the
property from the land grant filed an action to quiet title to the sand
and gravel in the U.S. District Court,103 claiming that sand and
gravel—while valuable today—were not valuable minerals in 1919
even if they were minerals; and, thus, the expectations of the parties
(Congress and all prospective patentees) at the time of the statutory
grant could not have been that sand and gravel were reserved. The
District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled in favor of government ownership of the sand and gravel pursuant to the reservations in the patent.104 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and interpreted the patent in favor of the patentees and their
successors’ claims to ownership of the sand and gravel.105 In doing so,
the Court reached its decision—again in spirit more than expressly—
within the contours of the determinacy norm.
The BedRoc Court explained that the word “valuable” made this
case distinguishable from Western Nuclear where the language there
did not have the modifier “valuable” in front of the word “minerals.”106
The Pittman Act reserved a narrower set of interests for the United
98. See BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 179-80.
99. Pittman Act, ch. 77, § 8, 41 Stat. 293, 295 (1919) (emphasis added); BedRoc, 541
U.S. at 179-80 (quoting the granting language from the Act).
100. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 180-81.
101. Id. at 180.
102. Id. at 180-81.
103. Id. at 181.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 185-87.
106. Id. at 182-83 (“Whatever the correctness of Western Nuclear’s broad construction
of the term ‘minerals,’ we are not free to so expansively interpret the Pittman Act’s
reservation.”).
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States than the set of interests reserved under the SRHA.107 Stated differently, a patentee’s package of property rights was larger in a
Pittman Act-authorized land grant than in an SRHA-authorized land
grant.
The BedRoc Court went on to adopt some of the basic tenets of the
determinacy norm as it went about identifying the meaning of the
terms in the patent. First, it explained that Congress’s intent should
be interpreted based on a presumption that, when drafting, Congress
was looking at the existing situation and adopting a practical, ordinary, and popular meaning of the terms it used. This presumption regarding the method of term choice means that the terms must be
judged by looking at the then-present circumstances that could be
identifiable by all relevant stakeholders when setting their expectations in 1919.108
The BedRoc Court emphasized that, “[i]mportantly, the proper inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the reservation at the time
Congress enacted it”109 and quoting Leo Sheep explained that “landgrant statutes should be interpreted in light of ‘the condition of the
country when the acts were passed.’ ”110 It further quoted Perrin v.
United States, noting, “ ‘[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning’
at the time Congress enacted the statute.”111
Looking at this contemporaneous understanding, the Court framed
the central question as being about what the parties could determine
with a level of determinacy at the time of the patent (i.e., “Because the
Pittman Act applied only to Nevada, the ultimate question is whether
the sand and gravel found in Nevada were commonly regarded as ‘valuable minerals’ in 1919.”).112 It concluded that “[c]ommon sense tells
us, and the Government does not contest, that the answer to that question is an emphatic ‘No’ ” because sand and gravel were abundant and
“commercially worthless in 1919 due to Nevada’s sparse population
and lack of development;”113 and “even if Nevada’s sand and gravel

107. Id. (“Here, by contrast [to Western Nuclear], Congress has textually narrowed the
scope of the term by using the modifier ‘valuable.’ ”).
108. See id. at 184 (“In interpreting statutory mineral reservations like the one at issue
here, we have emphasized that Congress ‘was dealing with a practical subject in a practical
way’ and that it intended the terms of the reservation to be understood in ‘their ordinary and
popular sense.’ ” (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 873 (1999))).
109. Id. (emphasis added) (first citing Amoco, 526 U.S. at 874; then citing Leo Sheep Co.
v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979)).
110. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 682).
111. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444
U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
112. Id.
113. Id.

2016]

DEEDS AND DETERMINACY NORM

817

were regarded as minerals, no one would have mistaken them for valuable minerals.”114 The Court flatly rejected the government’s attempt
to look beyond 1919 or beyond Nevada to tag sand and gravel as valuable, because neither set of facts would be relevant to the meaning attached by the parties to the land grant at the time of the Pittman Act’s
enactment and the patenting in question.115 The Court determined that
the language was clear and stated, “Because we readily conclude that
the ‘most natural interpretation’ of the mineral reservation does not
encompass sand and gravel, we ‘need not consider the applicability of
the canon that ambiguities in land grants are construed in favor of the
sovereign.’ ”116 Nor would it accept the government’s attempt to search
legislative history because a “contemporaneous plain meaning of the
Pittman Act’s mineral reservation” indeed existed.117 The parties’ ability to discern their rights based on the language itself and the circumstances present and knowable to them was key in the holding.
IV. BRANDT REVOCABLE TRUST V. UNITED STATES:
THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THE DETERMINACY NORM
AT PLAY IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
The 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandt Revocable Trust
v. United States118 serves as the latest in a line of cases where the Court
has recognized the determinacy norm—even though not expressly doing so. An analysis of the case reveals the endorsements within the
decision for the tenets of the determinacy norm. At issue in the case
was a railroad right-of-way that was abandoned and the question of
what happens to that easement after the abandonment.119 As the Court
explained it:
This case presents the question of what happens to a railroad’s right
of way granted under a particular statute—the General Railroad
Right-of-Way Act of 1875 [“1875 Act”]—when the railroad abandons
it: does it go to the Government, or to the private party who acquired
the land underlying the right of way?120

114. Id.
115. See id. at 184-85.
116. Id. at 185 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999));
see also id. at 186-87 (“Having declined to extend Western Nuclear’s rationale to a statute
where the plain meaning will not support it, we will not allow it in through the back door by
presuming that ‘the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’ ”
(quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
117. Id. at 186.
118. 134 S. Ct. 1257 (2014).
119. Id. at 1263-64; see also id. at 1262 (“This case requires us to define the nature of the
interest granted by the 1875 Act, in order to determine what happens when a railroad abandons its right of way.”).
120. Id. at 1260.
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The 1875 Act121 “provided that ‘[t]he right of way through the public
lands of the United States is granted to any railroad company’ meeting
certain requirements, ‘to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of
the central line of said road.’ ”122 At least fifteen special acts granting
railroad rights-of-way had preceded this “general” 1875 Act, which was
intended to alleviate the need for constant enactments of “special”
acts.123 The 1875 Act also had language that was somewhat distinct
from the earlier acts regarding the rights held by the railroads, making
some of the past precedent regarding those other acts irrelevant.124
In 1976, the United States “patented”—or, in essence, granted—an
83–acre parcel of land to Melvin and Lulu Brandt, giving them “fee
simple title to the land ‘with all the rights, privileges, immunities, and
appurtenances, of whatsoever nature, thereunto belonging, unto said
claimants, their successors and assigns, forever,’ ”125 with some limited
exceptions and reservations for rights-of-way held by the United
States (none of which were at issue in the case). The one reservation
in the Brandt patent that was at issue in the case was one “stating
that the land was granted ‘subject to those rights for railroad purposes
as have been granted to the Laramie[,] Hahn’s Peak & Pacific Railway
Company [“LHP&P”], its successors or assigns,’ ” but “[t]he patent did
not specify what would occur if the railroad abandoned this right of
way.”126 Here, the railroad right-of-way in question “was obtained by
[LHP&P] in 1908, pursuant to the 1875 Act,” and “[n]early a half-mile
stretch of the right of way crosses Brandt’s land in Fox Park, covering
ten acres of that parcel.”127 The LHP&P right-of-way changed ownership many times and the last owner, the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad, “notified the Surface Transportation Board of its intent to
abandon the right of way” in 1996.128 By 2004, the railroad completed
the abandonment, including tearing up the tracks and ties and receiving the Surface Transportation Board’s approval to abandon the
right-of-way.129
After abandonment was complete, the United States believed that
it owned the right-of-way. The United States argued “that it had all
along retained a reversionary interest in the railroad right of way—
121. 43 U.S.C. §§ 934-939 (2012) (repealed insofar as applicable to the issuance of rightsof-way over, upon, under, and through the public lands and lands in the National Forest
System, 1976).
122. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1261 (alteration in original) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 934).
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 1262 (quoting the terms of the patent).
126. Id. (first alteration in original).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1263.
129. Id.
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that is, a future estate that would be restored to the United States if
the railroad abandoned or forfeited its interest.”130 In 2006, it filed an
action against the owners of thirty-one parcels affected by the LHP&P
right-of-way, including the Brandts, “seeking a judicial declaration of
abandonment and an order quieting title in the United States to the
abandoned right of way.”131 The Brandts were the only owners who
fought the action; others settled or were subjects of default judgments.
The Brandts believed that once the property was abandoned by the
railroads that “the stretch of the right of way crossing his family’s land
was a mere easement that was extinguished upon abandonment by the
railroad, so that, under common law property rules, [the Brandts] enjoyed full title to the land without the burden of the easement.”132
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the district court ruled in favor of
the government’s position, as did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit (although recognizing a division among lower courts
over the scope of abandoned 1875 Act rights-of-way).133 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
Although the patent did not say what would happen when the railroad abandoned this right-of-way (nor did the statute), the consequence was nonetheless knowable and should have been known by
both the patentee and the government through an analysis of the generally applicable legal principles known to all at the time of the grant
of the right-of-way, the patent, and the statutory enactments that authorized both. The surrounding legal environment informs the expectations of the parties.
In a previous decision, Great Northern Railway Co. v. United
States,134 the U.S. Supreme Court had already interpreted the 1875
Act’s rights-of-way and determined that they were basic easements.135
Thus, here in Brandt, the Court very simply stated that, because these
are easements held by the railroad and because “[t]he United States

130. Id.
131. Id. The Brandt case is, in many ways, related to a larger body of cases regarding
“rails-to-trails” legislation and easement conversion efforts. See Saxer, supra note 7, at 35162. Those cases usually focused on issues regarding the scope of the easement or whether an
easement had been abandoned, while the Brandt litigation focused on the nature of the
rights between the parties based on the deed language. See id. at 362-63.
132. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1263.
133. Id. Included among the courts holding contrary to the Tenth Circuit opinion in
United States v. Brandt, 496 F. App’x 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2012), are decisions by the Seventh
and Federal Circuits. See Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Tr. v. Bayfield Cty., 649 F.3d 799, 803
(7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the 1875 Act gave no indication to patentees or the railroad
holders of rights-of-way that they should “suspect a lurking governmental right so unsettling
to the security of private property rights”); Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (discussing the disposition of lands subject to rights-of-way under the 1875 Act).
134. 315 U.S. 262 (1942).
135. Id. at 271.
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did not reserve to itself any interest in the right of way in that patent,”136 there is a law of easements to be applied and that informs the
meaning of the rights-of-way as of their creation in 1875. That meaning remained unchanged when the land burdened by the easement was
transferred from the United States to the Brandts through the 1976
patent.137 The Great Northern Court clearly identified the interests
conferred to the railroads in the 1875 Act as easements only, distinguishing the 1875 Act as granting a more limited interest than some
of the prior special rights-of-way acts.138 Great Northern held that the
1875 Act “clearly grants only an easement, and not a fee,”139 looking at
the statutory language that all parties could decipher as of 1875140 and
confirming that interpretation based on the historical background
against which Congress and other individuals could judge the meaning
of the rights-of-way as of 1875.141
Once the Brandt Court defined the interest as a simple easement,
the majority easily resolved the case based on the common law which
informs all grants of property interests. When drafting and articulating their intent, all parties can be expected to rely on the common law
as applied to the terms of the statute in order to predict the expected
interpretation of the scope of the easements. After quoting the Restatement definition of an easement as a “nonpossessory right to enter and
use land in the possession of another and obligat[ing] the possessor not
to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement”142 and explaining that easements may be abandoned (unlike most real property interests which cannot be abandoned),143 the Court concluded that “[t]he
essential features of easements—including, most important here,
what happens when they cease to be used—are well settled as a matter
of property law.”144 Easements are limited rights.145

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265.
See id. at 1265-66.
Id. at 1264.
Great N., 315 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 273-77.
Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)).
143. Id. (“Unlike most possessory estates, easements . . . may be unilaterally terminated
by abandonment, leaving the servient owner with a possessory estate unencumbered by the
servitude.” (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. d, § 7.4 cmts. a, f
(AM. LAW INST. 2000)) (alteration in original).
144. Id.
145. THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.02(a), at 460 (David A. Thomas ed., Matthew
Bender & Co., 2d Thomas ed. 2006) (1924) (“[A]n easement is ‘an interest in land in the
possession of another’ that entitles the easement owner to ‘limited use or enjoyment’ of that
land . . . .”(quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 450, at 2901 (AM. LAW INST. 1944))).
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The conclusion from this well-settled law—against which Congress
was presumed to legislate and upon which both parties receiving
rights-of-way and those encumbered by the rights-of-way identify a determinate meaning, set their expectations, and establish their reliance—is that “if the beneficiary of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears, and the landowner resumes his full and unencumbered interest in the land.”146
The Brandt Court rejected multiple arguments where the government attempted to inject post-1875 evidence to establish what Congress meant when it set the terms for the 1875 Act right-of-way.147
What rights were granted in 1875 (or what the railroads’ rights and
expectations were in 1908 pursuant to the grant as-authorized in
1875) cannot be determined based on events or conditions that occurred or manifested at some later date after the grant without injecting a high degree of indeterminacy into the grant. The Court explained
that the government’s reliance on “later enacted statutes” was wrong,
citing Leo Sheep and its contemporaneous-meaning discussion, because “[t]he case turn[ed] on what kind of interest Congress granted
to railroads in their rights of way in 1875.”148 The Court further stated
that these later statutes do not “shed light on what kind of property
interest Congress intended to convey to railroads in 1875,”149 quoting
the cautionary note regarding determinacy from United States v. Price,
where the Court previously warned that “the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier

146. Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1265 (citing Smith v. Townsend, 148 U.S. 490, 499 (1893)); see
also id. (“[W]hoever obtained title from the government to any . . . land through which ran
this right of way would acquire a fee to the whole tract subject to the easement of the company, and if ever the use of that right of way was abandoned by the railroad company the
easement would cease, and the full title to that right of way would vest in the patentee of
the land.” (alterations in original) (quoting Smith, 148 U.S. at 499)); id. (“[T]he purchasers
or grantees of the United States took the fee of the lands patented to them subject to the
easement created by the act of 1824; but on a discontinuance or abandonment of that right
of way the entire and exclusive property, and right of enjoyment thereto, vested in the proprietors of the soil.”) (citation omitted).
147. See id. at 1266-68.
148. Id. at 1268 (emphasis added) (citing Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,
681 (1979)); see also id. (“The pertinent inquiry in this case is the intent of Congress when it
granted land to the Union Pacific in 1862.” (quoting Leo Sheep Co., 440 U.S. at 681)).
149. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
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one.”150 Any attempts to change the scope of rights-of-way reservations
were irrelevant after the interests in the land had already been
allocated.151
The Brandt Court concluded that:
[B]asic common law principles resolve this case. When the Wyoming
and Colorado Railroad abandoned the right of way in 2004, the easement referred to in the Brandt patent terminated. Brandt’s land became unburdened of the easement, conferring on him the same full
rights over the right of way as he enjoyed over the rest of the Fox
Park parcel.152

This holding is certainly a correct interpretation of the law of easements and reflects the expectations of the burdened estate holder to
be unburdened upon abandonment.153
Part of what was at stake in all of these cases, and particularly in
Brandt, was a profound need for the protection of property rights as
expressed in deeds and the sanctity of those rights measured by objective enforcement of determinate terms.154 As Justice Joseph Story explained in the case of Wilkinson v. Leland, once a legislature has made
a grant of real property, that grant must be respected, and subsequent
action cannot have retroactive effects to alter that initial conferral of
property rights.155 The idea that property once transferred must be recognized as transferred, and that the act of the transfer itself should
not be subject to retroactive change, is captured well in this passage:
The fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require, that
the rights of personal liberty and private property should be held
sacred. . . . In Terret vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43, it was held by this
Court, that a grant or title to lands once made by the legislature to
any person or corporation is irrevocable, and cannot be re-assumed
by any subsequent legislative act; and that a different doctrine is

150. Id. (quoting Price, 361 U.S. at 313). For additional support for this proposition, see
Hastings & D.R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 360-61 (1889) (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839) for the proposition that once land is severed from the public lands
and transferred to others, it is “one of the fundamental principles underlying the land system
of this country” that “no subsequent law or proclamation” may alter that transfer).
151. See Brandt, 134 S. Ct. at 1268 (“[P]olicy shift[s] cannot operate to create an interest
in land that the Government had already given away.”).
152. Id. at 1266.
153. See JAMES W. ELY, JR. & JON W. BRUCE, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN
LAND § 10.8, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2015) (“[C]essation of purpose doctrine is
designed to eliminate meaningless burdens on land and is based on the notion that parties
that create an easement for a specific purpose intend the servitude to expire upon cessation
of that purpose.”) (footnote omitted).
154. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 702 (“Brandt follows the Supreme Court’s longstanding
policy of upholding certainty and predictability in land titles.”).
155. Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657-58 (1829).
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utterly inconsistent with the great and fundamental principle of a
republican government, and with the right of the citizens to the free
enjoyment of their property lawfully acquired.156

There are, of course, many other values at stake that require respecting the determinacy of deeds, and the next Part analyzes a few additional benefits of adherence to the norm.
V. VALUES ADVANCED BY A DETERMINACY NORM
OF DEED INTERPRETATION
The value and utility of a determinacy norm for deeds seems relatively obvious, so this Part will be relatively short. It will just highlight some of the benefits arising from, and values advanced by, adhering to rules that inject determinacy into the meaning and interpretation of deeds, some of which were also already noted in Part II.
Determinate deeds are a fundamental element in any reliable property system.157 The harder it becomes to confidently identify how a
deed will be interpreted, the less stable the real property system becomes. Likewise, a higher confidence quotient for determinate meaning in deeds breeds a healthy and prosperous property system.
The Latin maxim nemo dat qui non habet—one who does not have
cannot give158—is a foundational guide in our society where ownership
is the currency of property. In order to know what we can give, we need
to understand what we have (or, own), and we primarily turn to our
deeds to give us the answers. Knowing what one has to give and being
able to predict the meaning of deed terms is a prerequisite to any legitimate property transaction. Of course, the rights conveyed in deeds
would be relatively worthless if they did not have a fixed and knowable
meaning. Our ability to confidently assess the meaning of our deeds is
vital to the necessary high level of certainty that contributes to any
efficient economic transfers or investments in the property in question.159 We need to know what all parties to a property transaction have
156. Id.; see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 23 (1990)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] sovereign, ‘by ipse dixit, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation. . . . This is the very kind of thing that the Taking
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980))).
157. See LOCKE, supra note 36, at § 7, at 9-10; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 54 (1995) (“The right set of rules governing control over one’s
person and the assignment of ownership of property play an indispensable part in any social
system that seeks to maximize the welfare of its citizens.”).
158. Nemo dat qui non habet, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
159. See Hernando de Soto, Opinion, What If You Can’t Prove You Had a House?, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/20/opinion/20iht-edsoto.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“We take the law for granted; but without legal documents, people do not
exist in a market. If property, business organizations and transactions are not legally documented, they are fated to remain forever uninterpreted and society cannot work as a
whole.”).
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at the time of the transfer so that planning can occur, rights can forever be identified, and interests in the property can be verifiably and
effectively sold in the future.
Deeds provide information about the true allocation of ownership
rights in any one piece of land valuable to a wide array of individuals.160 Deeds help identify rights for the grantor, grantee, and multiple
interest holders in one piece of land. Deeds also work to facilitate market transactions because those engaged in the transaction have a
source from which to identify the rights one has, the authority to transfer, and the rights the other can obtain through purchase. Deeds are
the primary authority for judges interpreting disputes over competing
claims to property ownership and in resolving conflicts between multiple interest holders.
Those who wish to buy from, invest in, contract with, lease from, or
provide capital to real property owners, and many others will all want
to know what is in a deed and how it will be interpreted. These stakeholders need to have some confidence in finding a determinate meaning for the deed terms before it is adjudicated. Individuals will want to
know what they are getting when purchasing property, for example,
and for that they will look at the deed. Prospective buyers of property
require discernible deed rights with predictable interpretation to determine the price they are willing to pay. Similarly, those who wish to
provide loans based on a piece of property securing the loan or to make
other capital investments in property will need assurances that they
can identify what rights are included in the recipient’s ownership
package as articulated in determinate deeds.161 Mortgages and deeds
of trust, for example, will not issue without confidence in deed rights.
Leaseholders need to inspect deeds to know what rights the lessor actually has to lease. Title insurance companies will base their premium
on the level of security in a deed and the predicted meaning that will
attach to its terms. Any interested members of the public that may
need to interact with the property at some point in time will demand
the ability to identify the rights in the relevant deeds with a high level
of certainty about the determinate meaning of the deed’s terms.
Predictability of interpretation and reliability of enforcement of
deed terms become the linchpins of land’s worth.162 To the extent there
160. Gerald Korngold explains the broad public need for access to title information: “Current and potential participants in land transfer and finance transactions need information
so markets can operate efficiently and fairly, thus benefiting those particular players as well
as society.” Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and
Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 743 (2009). Although he was speaking of the
need for records, deeds serve that function as well.
161. See de Soto, supra note 159 (“In the developing world, neither capital nor credit will
venture where there are no clear property rights.”).
162. See Hodges, supra note 7, at 696 (discussing Brandt and contending that “[l]andowners rely on those definitions and terms [used by the common law of property] to establish
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are any ambiguities, investors and others interested in a property will
investigate the intent of the parties and the law existing at the time of
the conveyance to predict how those terms will be interpreted. If the
legal rules of deed interpretation give clear guidance as to what to look
for and what the relevant time period is for the inquiry (time of conveyance), then a successful investigation is an achievable task, and one
can estimate with some degree of certainty how the courts are likely
to interpret the deed so long as the court also follows the same rules.
But, if the methods and rules of interpretation are themselves indeterminate, then so too will be the meaning of the deed. Upon reading a
deed and evaluating the terms in it, the potential investor will assess
risk.163
Whenever one market participant wishes to exchange rights with
another—such as in the acquisition of property—she demands some
level of confidence in knowing what she is getting. The level of certainty the would-be acquirer or transferee has in the deed and its expected interpretation is directly proportional to the level of investment
the acquirer will make in completing the deal. The higher the risk that
a contrary interpretation will be adopted by the courts, the lesser the
would-be acquirer’s confidence and willingness to invest in the property. Transactions involving high-risk deeds due to uncertainty of interpretation cannot occur on anything other than sub-optimal terms
for parties on both sides of a negotiation. Deals to transfer the property
may unnecessarily face a road block entirely, investment amounts will
be lowered that may not need to be, or the price for the acquisition of
the property in question will be inefficiently discounted to account for
the high risk.
To avoid such inefficiencies, the law should strive to make the rules
of deed interpretation and their application consistent, clear, and
based in a determinate meaning identified from the intent of the parties at the point of the deed creation or transfer.164 This injection of
determinacy to deeds can only be achieved by giving deeds a fixed and
unalterable meaning (or, at least only alterable through private, consensual agreement to make a change). The more determinate the deed,

ownership of property”); Waldron, supra note 43, at 6 (“Citizens . . . need predictability in
the conduct of their lives and businesses. . . . [F]reedom is . . . possible if people know in
advance how the law will operate, and how they must act to avoid its having a detrimental
impact on their affairs.”).
163. See Hernando de Soto, President, Inst. of Liberty & Democracy, Keynote Address
at the Opening Ceremony of the IBA Annual Conference 2008: Law Connects, in INT’L B.
NEWS, Dec. 2008, at 14, 14 (“[I]t’s the law that represents you in documents. It’s through law
and legal documents that you’re able to identify facts, that you’re able to identify risks.”).
164. NORTH, supra note 3, at 137 (“Institutions determine the performance of
economies[.]”).
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where there is a higher level of confidence regarding the rights enforceable in it, the more likely that a deal—transfer, investment, mortgage
or other loan associated with the rights, etc.—will be completed.
For similar reasons, individuals will not invest in their own property in an efficient or optimal manner if they do not have confidence in
what rights they already hold in the property pursuant to their deeds.
This risk of owner under-investment is a real and unfortunate consequence to indeterminate deeds. To incentivize more investment, we
should do our very best to adhere to legal rules of deed interpretation
that allow owners to make educated determinations of their deed
rights with a low probability of error and a high probability that the
courts will enforce those deeds according to the terms as understood
by the parties to the deeds at the time of their conveyance.165
Deeds are only as good as their predictable interpretation. And predictions also cannot be made with any sense of accuracy unless there
exists, and unless those interacting with the deeds have confidence in,
a stable and objective court system that is accessible in the event of a
dispute.
Moreover, beyond setting up the neutral court system, there must
be some trust in the operational and interpretive rules of those institutions. There must be an ability to confidently and accurately predict
how the neutral enforcement system will adjudicate disputes over the
terms in deeds. Thus, we demand neutral institutions that follow those
rules of interpretation that promote the determinacy norm.166 As North
explains:
[T]hird-party enforcement . . . has been the critical underpinning of
successful modern economies involved in the complex contracting
necessary for modern economic growth. . . . A coercive third party is
essential. . . . Indeed, effective third-party enforcement is best realized by creating a set of rules that then make a variety of informal
constraints effective.167

The existence of an authoritative source for interpretation is important, but it lacks much value if that source can upset determinacy
in deeds. So we must ask that the institutions are independent, impartial, neutral, and objective. But we must also ask that the rules they
develop limit the pool of available outcomes in any deed dispute. The

165. Waldron, supra note 43, at 6 (“Knowing in advance how the law will operate enables
one to plan around its requirements. And knowing that one can count on the law to protect
certain personal rights and property rights enables each citizen to deal effectively with other
people and the state.”) (footnote omitted).
166. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25 (1962) (“In both games and
society also, no set of rules can prevail unless most participants most of the time conform to
them without external sanctions.”).
167. NORTH, supra note 3, at 35.
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interpretive rules must solidify rights and act as a means for constraining the practical behavior of the judges regarding property
deeds. Only then do individuals have the ability to predict what the
judicial interpretation will be should any dispute arise, a necessary
precondition to adjusting their own market behaviors.
The existence of a rule of law for the interpretation of deeds aids in
advance of any court ruling the evaluation of whether one should invest or acquire any particular piece of real property because the matter
of court interpretation is not a speculative enterprise.168 When there is
this neutrality and objectivity in the institutions and a commitment to
finding determinate interpretations of deeds in adjudication, the judgments of the adjudicating institutions are sufficiently predictable ex
ante. Once parties engaging in a transaction can predict the resolution
of possible disputes over deed terms, they can transact in a manner
that avoids litigation. This can be accomplished by price adjustments
to reflect risk or assignments of risk or liabilities. So, courts committed
to the determinacy norm in deed interpretation are just as effective
when they are not hearing cases, so long as they exist and so long
as there is loyal and recognizable adherence to the determinacy norm
in their deed-based jurisprudence. When those conditions obtain,
parties order their affairs efficiently without the necessity of court
intervention.169
So long as individuals know the means of interpretation of deeds
that the courts will employ and that the courts will work to honor the
deals made according to their original terms as understood and intended by the parties, owners and potential owners or investors in the
property will be able to predict how the neutral arbiters will resolve
possible disputes or claimed ambiguities in the deeds.170 With determinate deeds, confidence in what one owns, in what she has the authority
to transfer, and in what other parties she will interact with own (and
have the authority to transfer) breeds efficient incentives that help
property flow smoothly in commerce. Once we accept that one can only
own or transfer as much property as the deed allows, then it is easy to
168. Cf. Hernando de Soto, The Destruction of Economic Facts, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 28, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
11_19/b4227060634112.htm (“The rule of law is much more than a dull body of norms: It is
a huge, thriving information and management system that filters and processes local data
until it is transformed into facts organized in a way that allows us to infer if they hang
together and make sense.”).
169. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 166, at 25-27 (explaining that so long as the system is
structured correctly, the markets benefit from, but need not use, the legal system as an enforcement mechanism).
170. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 22 (2003) (“The documented effect of increasing rule of law values on economic growth
is robust. Individuals are more willing to invest in economic growth where property rights
are stable, contracts are secure, and arbitrary governmental action is restrained.”).
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also understand the importance of having the capability to discern
what deed rights one has based on determinate interpretation rules
that produce determinate deeds. It is in these determinate deeds
and our trust that the courts will honor that determinacy in deed
interpretation and enforcement that we achieve an authoritative and
confident assessment of respective rights.
Finally, there is one other benefit worth mentioning briefly regarding working toward determinate meaning in deeds—fairness and the
avoidance of an unjust windfall for a party involved in the transfer of
the property rights reflected in the deed. So long as the courts are
working to find a meaning intended by the parties at the time of conveyance, then the prescribed meaning of the deed will be both determinate and fairly allocate the rights as the parties would have expected. The court will interpret the deed’s terms in a manner that reflects the values that the parties set for the exchange at the time of
conveyance. To upset that contemporaneous bargain would necessarily
give one party an ex post advantage without requiring that he make a
purchase to get it. The rules should never be set up in a way that would
give someone more than they bargained for merely by interpreting a
deed to mean something other than what the parties intended at the
point of the deal.171 By following the determinacy norm, the courts
avoid abetting such bonanzas.
VI. CONCLUSION
This determinacy norm for the interpretation of deed terms is real.
An examination of Brandt and the other cases described in this Article
proves the determinacy norm’s presence and prevalence in the jurisprudential standards for interpreting deeds, in spite of the fact that
the courts have not given their bases and methods of decision making
such a label. There is a purpose to the rules for deed interpretation
that fails to get adequate recognition precisely because we have not
created this organizing term and normative theme for these interpretive rules. This Article has aimed to fill those thematic and terminological gaps.
As part of the determinacy norm, there is a longstanding tenet of
property that private conveyances and statutory land grants are to be
interpreted at the time of the grant in accordance with the intent of

171. Although it was in a different context, Justice Joseph Story made this point well
when he explained that there is no case where “a legislative act to transfer the property of
A. to B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of legislative power
in any state in the union. On the contrary, it has been constantly resisted as inconsistent
with just principles, by every judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced.”
Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829).

2016]

DEEDS AND DETERMINACY NORM

829

the parties.172 The rule of law and the infrastructure for the protection
of property rights that includes the determinate interpretation of
deeds are vital components of the governmental structure that support
the functioning of a private property system.173 Impartially securing to
individuals what they own is a fundamental obligation of good governance.174 Doing so requires a neutral, transparent, consistent, and discernable set of rules for the interpretation of deed terms that effectuates the intent of the parties executing the deeds. It requires judicial
adherence to the determinacy norm for deeds, providing confident and
authoritative measures of ownership so that parties can govern their
own private relations and so that the courts can intervene when necessary to resolve disputes in an objective manner and preserve the
rights obtained in deeds.175
If we more forcefully support and openly acknowledge the quest to
make deeds determinate that is furthered by the interpretive rules
that we already recognize, the law and its deed-based jurisprudence
can better monitor and check the actions of judges to be sure that they
are living up to the purposes of the determinacy norm. Adding such
safeguards to deed agreements will help us better identify and protect
the rights in deeds that help organize our ownership society.

172. 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 191, supra note 4 (“Courts may determine the intent of the parties in a disputed deed with reference to the position of the parties at the time of conveyance
and in light of surrounding circumstances, and resort to rules of construction.”).
173. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 17 (1985) (“Within the original framework the rich array of procedural and jurisdictional protections was expected to serve . . . the protection of private property, of ‘lives, liberties, and estates’ that Locke considered the purpose of government.”).
174. James Madison firmly observed that “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property
of every sort . . . . This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.” James Madison, Property, NAT’L
GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174.
175. See LOCKE, supra note 36, at 66 (“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of
their property.”).
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